The complexity of business markets, resulting from different levels of organization and the ways social constructs combine across levels, 9 means no clear theory of relational coordination has been developed. The relationship and network framework of the industrial marketing and 10 purchasing (IMP) group provides a means of handling this complexity. This paper proposes a collaborative interest model (CIM) of relational 11 coordination, which partially overcomes these problems by examining the coordination process within a context that accounts for levels of 12 organization. This conceptualization of coordination processes resulting from firm intentions to achieve relationship performance presents a 13 new way to empirically examine relational coordination. An empirical test of the model using structural equation methodology shows 14 relational coordination (i.e., commitment and trust) explains relationship performance better than market coordination mechanisms. Coordination, cooperation and the use of power to effect 21 exchange in business markets and distribution channels 22 have long been studied in marketing (Anderson and Narus, 23 1986; Brown, 1979; Gaski, 1984; Rosenberg and Stern, 24 1971; Wilkinson, 1973; Wilson and Nielson, 2000). While 25 coordination is achieved in many ways, in an abstract sense, 26 all methods are a combination of three high order mecha-27 nisms: market forces, hierarchical control and relational 28 coordination (Bonoma, 1976; Bradach and Eccles, 1989; 29 Weitz and Jap, 1995). Relational coordination, where at 30 least two firms work collectively to realize outcomes that 31 cannot be achieved alone, remains poorly understood. This 32 is partly explained by the lack of dyadic studies of firms in 33 business relationships (cf. Bonoma et al., 1978; Håkansson, 34 1982). However, developments in the industrial marketing 35 and purchasing (IMP) group's interaction and network 36 framework (Ford, 1990; Håkansson, 1982; Håkansson and 37 Snehota, 1995) Macneil's (1974 Macneil's ( , 1978Macneil's ( , 58 1980 Macneil's ( , 1983 Macneil's ( , 1985 relational norms is undertaken. Norms (Håkansson and Snehota, 1995). In addition, 86 the IMP framework conceptualises three types of inter-87 action: those within business relationships, those between 88 the firms and the relationship and finally, interactions 89 between the relationship and the wider networks (cf. 90 Håkansson and Snehota, 1995).
Yet, trust and commitment are but two of a range of norms 142 that may exist within actor bonds. For instance , Macneil 143 (1974 , Macneil 143 ( , 1978 , Macneil 143 ( , 1980 , Macneil 143 ( , 1981 , Macneil 143 ( , 1983 , Macneil 143 ( , 1985 suggested a range of The point of departure for Macneil (1974 Macneil ( , 1978 with relational norms to assure continuance (Macneil, 1974, 155 1978). Macneil (1980) proposes three classes of norms. The 
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That relational norms develop within a relationship, 172 while the norms for discrete contracts fit market situations 173 deserves close attention for there is ambiguity with regard to 174 levels of aggregation. That is, the relationship parties build 175 relational norms, which are likely to be based on culturally 176 embedded ideals yet are partially separated from societal 177 norms. On the other hand, market norms also exist and are 178 socially constructed in a wider environment (i.e., the mar-179 ket). That relational norms develop within a relationship 180 clearly places them at the same level of aggregation as actor 181 bonds, hence these two sets of constructs may be considered 182 as of equivalent analytic level. This leaves the problem of 183 how actor bonds (and relational norms) and firm level 184 coordination processes relate to each other within the IMP 185 framework.
186
The solution proposed here is based on Morgeson and 187 Hofman (1999) and the earlier work of Giddens (1979) , 188 where structure exists as a ''duality,'' which is at once a 189 context that results from interaction between parties and the 190 medium for that very same process of interaction. This 191 duality of structure, as context and medium, allows one to 192 conceive of actor bonds as an outcome of both parties' view 193 of an interaction, while at the same time this structure 194 conditions the interaction and also acts as the medium for 195 the interfirm coordination process. t1.1 Table 1 Comparison of constructs
t1.2
Actor bonds (Håkansson and Snehota, 1995) Macneils' relational norms (Macneil, 1980) Interfirm coordination dimensions Study constructs
t1.3
Trust mutual trust (Håkansson and Snehota, 1995) Mutuality-degree to which partners focus on the benefits of the relationship as a whole over the long-term, rather than monitoring individual transactions for fairness (Kaufmann and Stern, 1988) 
t1.5
None Role integrity the complexity with which activities are divided amongst the parties in a relationship (Macneil, 1980) None Role integrity dimensions of roles (Kaufmann and Stern, 1988) t1.6
None Propriety of means-multiple paths available to achieve any outcome when strong relationships develop (Macneil, 1980) (Macneil, 1980) .
232
The next section develops a composite model across 233 three levels of organization so that an appropriate setting is 234 used to examine potential relational coordination constructs 235 available for defining actor bonds. The relational coordination process exists within a spe-238 cific business context, where firms decide to work together 239 to achieve results that neither could individually realize. 240 These results have meaning at a firm level, but their true 241 significance from a relationship perspective is at a network 242 level, where relationship strategy has a main consequence. 243 The other consequence, which is ignored here, is at the firm 244 level. Hence, in this study, performance must be measured 245 with reference to the network and with regard to competing 246 networks. While Lumpkin and Dess (1996) point out that 247 performance has a number of dimensions, in this study 248 ''relationship performance'' as an output relative to the 249 network does not need to be examined as a multidimen-250 sional construct. As this study seeks to uncover the rela-251 tional constructs involved in relationship performance, it is 252 enough to focus on economic outcomes, which in the long-253 term subsume strategic outcomes. Thus, relationship per-254 formance within a network is an output of interaction 255 between two other levels of aggregation (firms and rela-256 tionship) and as such is a higher order unidimensional 257 construct. This is an important insight, for the reciprocal 258 conditioning effects between relational coordination con- 
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298 theoretical underpinning of relationship structure, purpose 299 and levels of analysis of the IMP framework. The inter-300 actions between specific coordination and actor bond con-301 structs are not discussed here in detail, for only some may 302 be required in the pursuit of relationship performance. 303 
Method

304
The methodology chosen to test this model involves a 305 survey of computer software firms engaged in the export/ 306 import of business software using principal/distributor or 307 principal/agent relationships. This specific industry segment 308 was chosen for several reasons. First, the business software 309 industry reflects a network structure because the product 310 requires close long-term relationships between principal and 311 distributor/agent to manage continuous change.
312
Second, our study, by focusing on one industry, con-313 trolled for the effect of industry culture on the study. This is 314 consistent with the approach undertaken in previous busi-315 ness relationship studies such as the automobile tyre sector 316 (Morgan and Hunt, 1994) or health care professionals 317 (Kalafatis and Miller, 1997) . Consequently, and since they 318 operate in a similar industry environment, these firms are 319 more likely to reveal relative strengths/weaknesses in rela-320 tion to their competitors than would firms operating in a 321 number of different industrial sectors where differing envir-322 onmental factors would require different skills in order to 323 perform.
324
Third, the problem of copyright breaches and piracy in 325 the computer software industry means that principals gen-326 erally seek to establish long-term relationships with known 327 and trusted partners. Opportunistic and short-term strategies 328 would be highly discouraged in a situation where providing 329 the software immediately exposes the principal to the risk of 330 intellectual property theft. Finally and very pragmatically, 331 the relative small size of this industry allowed the research-332 ers to achieve a reasonable degree of representativeness by 333 enabling a census whereby each known actor of the industry 334 is invited to participate in the study.
335
In this study, both sides of the principal/distributor 336 relationship have been included, so that a second study at 337 the dyad level might be conducted. However, the present 338 study only operationalizes potential actor bond constructs 339 from the perspective of an individual firm. In an initial step, 340 a comprehensive list of exporting firms (312 Australian, 175 341 New Zealand) was obtained from a commercial database. A 342 one-page facsimile survey was then used to identify those 343 firms involved in any type of distribution arrangement, 344 ranging from gentleman's agreement to legal arrangements. 
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SEM also allows use of a stepwise strategy to progres-398 sively simplify from a complex to a parsimonious model 399 (Kaplan, 1990 ). This process involves using modification Table 3 Constructs, sources and scales 
t3.3
Relationship experience (developed for present study) 2 * 1. In our firm's past relationships, the parties have treated problems as joint rather than individual responsibilities (strongly agree -strongly disagree).
t3.4
* 2. Our firm prefers to work out solutions to problems that benefit the relationship as a whole, and not only the individual parties.
t3.5
Future orientation (Ganesan, 1994) 2 * 1. We believe that over the long term our relationship with this partner will be profitable.
t3.6
* 2. Maintaining a long-term relationship with this partner is important to our firm.
t3.7
Economic goal (developed for present study) 2 For each goal indicate its relative importance to your firm's overall strategy with regard to the focus relationship: profit, sales, sales growth, * market share, * market share growth (extremely important -not important).
t3.8
Flexibility 2 * 1. Flexibility in response to requests for changes is a characteristic of this relationship.
t3.9
(Heide and John, 1992) * 2. The parties expect to make adjustments in the on-going relationship.
t3.10
3. The parties expect to be able to make adjustments to cope with changing circumstances.
t3.11
4. When an unexpected situation arises, the parties prefer to work out a new deal, rather than hold each other to the original terms.
t3.12
Role integrity (Kaufmann and Stern, 1988) 3 1. The exchange relationship with the partner firm has created a complex web of tasks related to our commercial activity.
t3.13
* 2. The exchange relationship with the partner firm has created a complex web of interactions over all kinds of issues.
t3.14 * 3. The exchange relationship with the other party is extremely complicated.
t3.15
* 4. The exchange relationship with the partner firm has created a complex web of interactions between us.
t3.16
5. The exchange relationship with the partner firm has created a complex web of tasks that extend beyond our direct commercial.
t3.17
Commitment 2 * 1. Our firm and the partner firm are very committed to each other.
t3.18
(Holm et al., 1996) * 2. The partner firm is very committed to our firm.
t3.19
3. The partner firm is willing to invest time and money in developing this relationship.
t3.20
4. The partner firm appears more concerned with their own outcomes in this relationship.
t3.21
Trust 3 1. At times in this relationship the other party cannot be trusted.
t3.22 (Morgan and Hunt, 1994) 2. In this relationship, the other party can be counted on to do what is right.
t3.23
* 3. The other party is truly sincere in their promises.
t3.24
* 4. The other party can be completely trusted to meet their obligations to the partnership.
t3.25
* 5. Our partner is perfectly credible.
t3.26
6. The other party can be counted on to help this firm if the need arises.
t3.27
Relationship performance (Aulakh et al., 1997; Holm et al., 1996) 2 Relative to your firm's expectations in the focus market what has been the performance of the interfirm relation on the following dimensions: overall performance, profit, sales, sales growth, * market share, * market share growth (extremely strong -not strong).
t3.28 t2.1 Table 2 Global measurement model Bozdogan, 1987) . Information theory based criteria 413 are measures of fit adjusted for complexity and so they are 414 useful tools for comparing embedded models.
415
Prior to employing SEM, confirmatory factor analyses 416 were conducted using a Pearson correlation matrix, by 417 considering jointly the indicators corresponding to the same 418 causal level. This led to three measurement analyses and the 419 resulting latent variables were then analysed together within 420 the global measurement model. Conforming to the concern 421 for controlling sample size biases, all of the selected items 422 have large t values (see Table 2 ). Following these analyses, 423 the constructs of ''communication'' and ''conflict harmon-424 ization'' were found unadmissible and, consequently, 425 removed. All other variables, including relationship per-426 formance, exhibited strong unidimensionality. Table 5 ). This suggests that a larger sample would 458 result in higher significance levels.
459
In the final model (see Fig. 2 Third, our empirical results support the view that rela-510 tional coordination works in conjunction with self-interest 511 (i.e., a firm's economic goals) to explain performance. That 512 is, relational coordination constructs do not alone explain 513 relationship performance; rather, they operate in combina-514 tion with subsumed self-interest constructs to achieve per-515 formance. Further, this suggests that any analysis of 516 business markets based merely on self-interest and eco-517 nomic constructs is reductive and flawed.
518
That economic goals do not explain more of relationship 519 performance variance is an interesting result. To our know- 
